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Editor's Note
Exceptions and Inconsistent Enforcement Undermine Policies
The hard rule is that rules are hard.
There are very few hard rules because if you make a policy too general, it covers situations you don't want it to. But if you make it too specific, you don't cover all the situations that need covering. And that's how rules get so complicated that nobody knows how to apply them.
This is how we got lawyers. (And a whole bunch of other stuff related to creation, interpretation, and enforcement of rules—like government.)
Polices work the same way. And more policies are not necessarily better. You know you're in trouble when you're making exceptions, creatively interpreting the language, or allowing different groups to make rules that may conflict with the general rules.
Here's the most important question I ask when someone wants me to draft a new policy for their employee handbook:
What problem are you trying to solve?
Okay, this is my question for pretty much everything. But when you're dealing with employment policies, you want to figure out if you actually need a whole official policy or just a difficult conversation with a couple people.
67%* of employment policies exist because somebody didn't want to have a difficult conversation. The rest are there because it was in the original handbook. *I completely made up that stat, but you nodded and weren't completely surprised.
Policies are not always the answer.
Do not make policies to address specific instances of humanity. Policies are only for organization-wide issues where one general rule will work. If you need more than one or two exceptions, you need to rethink how to address the issue.
The case below is a great example of how things get sideways, often when people are trying to do the right thing.
And flowers to Cozen for recognizing their summer associate (law student), Mark Schaeffer, who we all know actually wrote this. Nice work.
- Heather Bussing
A single exception can now unravel your entire workplace safety policy. The Third Circuit's decision on May 30, 2025, in Smith v. Atlantic City,1 underscores how even minor exceptions to grooming or masking rules can expose employers to legal risk. This decision raises the stakes for employers crafting policies that intersect with religious accommodations, particularly those involving mandatory masking or respirator use. The ruling makes clear that even well-intentioned safety policies can be invalidated if they contain practical or discretionary exceptions.
Alexander Smith, a firefighter employed by the Atlantic City Fire Department, was subject to the department's grooming policy which required firefighters to be clean-shaven. The policy was designed to ensure a proper seal when wearing self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs), which protect firefighters from smoke and toxic fumes. A tight seal is essential for the SCBA to function properly. An imperfect seal can be deadly.
Although Smith was originally hired as a firefighter in 2004, his role later shifted to that of an Air Mask Technician, responsible for maintaining and filling SCBAs. Despite no longer actively fighting fires, Smith remained classified as a firefighter and was still subject to the department's grooming policy, which required regular fit testing for SCBA use. Smith, whose religious beliefs required him to grow a beard, requested an exemption from the grooming policy that required him to be clean-shaven. The city denied his request, citing the possibility that he could be called into active duty in an emergency.
Smith sued the city, alleging that it violated his rights under Title VII by failing to provide reasonable accommodation and by retaliating against him for engaging in protected activity. He also claimed violations of his constitutional rights to the free exercise of religion and to equal protection under the law.
The Court ultimately ruled in Smith's favor, finding that his rights to free exercise and reasonable accommodation had been infringed. The Third Circuit's ruling on Smith's free exercise claim carries far-reaching implications for employers navigating religious accommodations in safety-sensitive roles.
In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court has generally allowed rules that infringe on religious freedoms as long as those rules are neutral, generally applicable, and do not involve other rights.2 Smith argued that exceptions to the SCBA-related policies rendered the grooming policy not generally applicable. The Third Circuit examined three key exceptions:
The Court held that the first exception (mustaches and off-duty facial hair) did not undermine the policy's general applicability. However, the second and third exceptions did. By allowing administrative staff to avoid fit testing and giving captains broad discretion to override safety policies, the city undermined the policy's general applicability.
The Third Circuit concluded that the policy was not generally applicable and was, therefore, subject to higher scrutiny. The city failed to meet that scrutiny because it could not demonstrate that denying Smith's request was the least restrictive means of achieving its interest in firefighter safety. As a result, the Court ruled in Smith's favor, allowing him to maintain his beard in accordance with his religious beliefs.
Notably, the Court rejected the city's argument that compliance with federal OSHA3 and New Jersey PEOSH4 regulations justified the denial. It also declined to give weight to the fact that the fit-testing exception appeared in a separate policy or that the captain's discretion applied broadly to all SCBA-related policies rather than specifically to the grooming policy. The Court instead focused on the practical effect of the policies as a whole.
This decision offers several important lessons for employers navigating religious accommodation requests related to PPE and masking requirements:
1 Smith v. City of Atl. City, No. 23-3265, 2025 WL 1537927 (3d Cir. May 30, 2025).
2 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3 29 C.F.R. § 1910.134.
4 N.J. Admin. Code § 12:100-10.10.
This alert was drafted with assistance from Mark Schaeffer, a Summer Associate in the firm's Pittsburgh office.
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